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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
vs. 
EDWARD PECK, : 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
Case No. 980343-CA 
Priority No. 2 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT PECK 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has jurisdiction in this matter 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann., § 78-2a-3(2)(e). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Was the complainant's testimony of having received 
calls, the purpose of which she does not know, and which she 
did not take time to determine sufficient to establish a prima 
facie case when the protective order provided for contact as 
it related to the subject of the mutual children of the 
parties? 
2. May the conviction stand when the Court's findings are 
not supported by the record? 
3. Where an alternative hypothesis consistent with 
innocence is not precluded by the evidence, may the Court 
convict? 
DETERMINATIVE LAW 
The determinative law in this case includes Utah Code 
Ann., § 76-5-108 which is the statute under which these 
charges are filed. The case of State of Utah v. Layman, 953 
P.2d 782 (Utah Ct. App. 1998)sets forth the requirements for 
evidence necessary to support a conviction and the need for 
the evidence to preclude all reasonable hypothesis of 
innocence. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Charges relating to violations of Protective Orders were 
filed on three different occasions against Mr, Peck during the 
spring of 1997. After a substantial period of time, all three 
of the warrants were finally served and the matter 
consolidated for trial. On March 9, 1998, all three cases 
were tried before the Honorable Anthony B. Quinn, in the West 
Valley Department of the Third Judicial District Court. One 
of the cases involved charges of protective order violation 
and telephone harassment; the other two cases each involved 
only protective order violations. Following a trial to the 
2 
bench, at which only the complainant and the defendant 
testified, the Court found Mr. Peck not guilty of the first 
Information which contained the two charges, but guilty of the 
remaining two protective order violations. Mr. Peck filed an 
appeal to this Court. Because of delays in the signing of the 
court judgment, proceedings were had before this Court before 
the appeal was finally allowed. By prior order of this Court, 
the appeal is perfected. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant Edward Peck, and the complainant, Amanda Eaby, 
had a relationship that produced twin babies. The relationship 
terminated, but friction between the parties survived the end 
of the relationship. (Transcript at p.5.) 
On December 30, 1996, Complainant obtained a protective 
order against Mr. Peck. As a part of the protective order, 
she received temporary custody of the minor children of the 
parties. (Protective order paragraph 11.) Mr. Peck, however, 
challenged custody in a separate proceeding. In executing the 
Protective Order, Judge Wilkinson further qualified the normal 
terms providing that the no-contact provision be amended with 
the exception of "except as it relates to visitation". 
(Protective Order.) 
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The instant case arises out of allegations made by the 
complainant that Mr. Peck violated the contact restrictions 
provision of that protective order on three different 
occasions. As a result of the allegations of the complainant, 
three Informations were issued from West Valley City. These 
three Informations consisting of four charges were 
consolidated for trial on March 9, 1998 before Judge Anthony 
Quinn. 
The first Information (971001390) alleged one count of 
violation of a protective order, and one count of telephone 
harassment, both occurring on February 2, 1997. From the 
computer dating, it appears that the charging document was 
prepared on March 26, 1997. 
Complainant claimed that she received a call while she 
was asleep on this date. That the phone rang a number of 
times, the number she was not certain, but by the time she got 
to it there was no-one there. She dialed *69 and it revealed 
that the call had come from the defendant's home telephone 
number. (Transcript at p.7.) She set the time of the call 
after midnight. Defendant was found not guilty of these two 
charges. 
4 
The second Information (971001871) alleged one count of 
violation of a protective order occurring on February 2, 1997. 
This charging document was prepared on April 23, *1997. 
The complainant testified that on this date she had 
received a call at about 11:00 p.m., that when she answered 
the phone that it was Mr. Peck and he asked if they could 
talk. She declined to talk to him. He asked again if they 
could talk and she hung up the phone. She stated that later 
she found a funeral notice of a mutual acquaintance in her 
car. (Transcript at pp 9-11.) The Court found Mr. Peck 
guilty of this charge. 
The third Information (971002372) alleged one count of 
violation of a protective order occurring on March 24, 1997. 
This charging document was prepared on May 19, 1997. 
The complainant testified that on this occasion she 
answered the phone, heard Mr. Peck's voice speak her name and 
immediately hung up. (Transcript at p. 12.) The Court found 
Mr. Peck guilty of this charge. 
Some time after all of these claimed events, Mr. Peck was 
served with the Informations, entered pleas of not guilty, and 
eventually had the matters heard in a bench trial. The only 
witnesses at trial were the complainant and the defendant. 
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Following the testimony of the complainant the defense moved 
to dismiss. The Court denied the motion. At the conclusion 
of the evidence, the Court found Mr. Peck not guilty on the 
charges found in the first Information and guilty of the two 
charges in the second and third Informations, 
Defendant appealed the convictions. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Where protective order violations are founded in the 
clause of the protective order prohibiting contact between the 
parties; and where that contact has not been completely 
prohibited but allowed under some circumstances; and where the 
nature of the contact was such that even by the allegations of 
the complainant, no purpose for the communications could be 
determined before communications were terminated, the State 
has failed to establish a prima facie case and the charges 
against the defendant should have been dismissed when the City 
rested. 
The Court did not dismiss the charges on motion of the 
defendant at the close of the prosecution's case and the 
defendant then testified that he had not made the telephone 
calls in question. No additional information was provided 
which added any support to the State's case. Thus, there was 
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insufficient evidence to ultimately support a conviction. 
The matter was further aggravated when the Court, at the 
close of the evidence, made its findings of fact; and in so 
doing, made reference to matters of evidence which in fact had 
not occurred and accordingly were not supported by the 
evidence. Thus, the finding of the Court is called into 
question. 
ARGUMENT 
I. 
THE COURT SHOULD HAVE GRANTED THE 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THE 
INFORMATIONS AT THE CLOSE OF THE 
PROSECUTION'S CASE WHEN THE EVIDENCE 
PRESENTED GAVE NO HINT OF THE INTENT OF THE 
CALLER AND WHERE CONTACT HAD NOT BEEN 
TOTALLY PROHIBITED BY THE PROTECTIVE ORDER. 
While a defendant need never present any evidence at 
trial, and even in the face of no evidence presented, the 
trier of fact must still determine if the evidence presented 
establishes every element of the offense beyond a reasonable 
doubt, a defendant is still entitled to a dismissal at the 
close of the prosecution case if the prosecution has failed to 
make a prima facie case as to each element of the offense 
charged. U.R.C.P. 18 (o). 
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At the conclusion of the bench trial, the Court found Mr. 
Peck guilty on two of the three counts of violation of a 
protective order, Utah Code Ann., § 76-5-108, both class A 
misdemeanors. The elements of this offense require proof that 
1) the defendant was subject to a protective order; 2) that he 
engaged in conduct that violated the terms of that order; and 
3) that he intentionally violated the terms of the order, i.e. 
that he acted with specific intent. 
In this case there was never any question respecting the 
first element. The complainant had obtained a protective 
order on December 30, 1996. But this order had not provided 
all that the complainant wanted. The Judge in his own 
handwriting had modified the form of the order to provide that 
the no contact provision of the order would still allow 
contact respecting visitation of the parties mutual children. 
(Trial Transcript Page 14, line 10 through Page 15 line 10.) 
This modification to the language of the order meant that 
the mere act of communication itself under this order was not 
a violation of the order. Such contact can only become a 
violation when done with improper purpose. Thus, under this 
order both the second and third elements of the offense would 
need proof of something beyond a mere contact before the 
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burden of the prosecution can be met. 
Before the second element can be found, there must be a 
showing that the call was for a purpose outside the 
restrictions of the order, and before the third element can be 
found it must be shown that such an improper purpose was the 
intent of the defendant- No evidence as to either of these 
critical elements of the charge is found in the evidence 
presented. 
Nevertheless, the Court denied defendant's motion to 
dismiss at the close of the City's case. In denying the 
motion to dismiss, the Court created a presumption not found 
in law. He ruled "I think calls that take place at 1:00 in 
the morning are ipso facto, not made for the purpose of 
conducting normal business/' (Transcript, page 25 line 3-6.) 
Even if there was such an assumption, it would not apply to 
the call claimed to have been made on February 20th. By the 
testimony of the complainant, that call was made at about 
11:00 p.m. (Transcript, page 9, lines 15-19.) So this call 
was not within the Court's presumption, the Court, however, 
denies the motion as to this Court because there is no 
discussion of visitation. 
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The testimony of the complainant on this issue is that 
the phone rang, she answered it, that she heard the defendant, 
that he said: "Can we talk?" To this non specific question she 
answered: "No, we cannot/' He answered: "We can't talk?" Or 
again repeated himself, and on that note the conversation 
ended. (Transcript page 18, lines 10-22.) She admits clearly 
that Mr. Peck never indicated "in any fashion whatsoever what 
it was he wanted to talk . . . about". (Id at lines 23-24.) 
Here, the Court places the burden on the defendant to 
announce quickly, within two comments the purpose of the call 
or be guilty of a class A misdemeanor. 
In State of Utah v. Layman, 953 P.2d 782 (Utah. Ct. App. 
1998) the Court sets the requirements for evidence sufficient 
to convict a criminal offense at a higher level. Finding the 
evidence in that case to be "inconclusive" the Court cautions: 
"Most importantly, however, neither possibilities nor 
probabilities can substitute for certainty beyond a reasonable 
doubt." The Court then goes on to quote State v. Murphy, 617 
P. 2d 399 (Utah 1980): 
Criminal convictions may not be based upon 
conjectures or probabilities and before we 
can uphold a conviction it must be 
supported by a quantum of evidence 
concerning each element of the crime as 
charged from which the jury may base its 
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conclusion of guilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt• 
State v. Murphy at 4 02, 
While a lower standard of proof exists for a motion at 
the close of the prosecution's case, it would be improper to 
create presumptions to support the denial of such a motion if 
they would not be valid presumptions for use in the final 
determination of the evidence. The prosecution failed to 
establish a prima facie case and the defense motion should 
have been granted as to both of the counts of conviction. 
II. 
THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT ARE NOT SUPPORTED 
BY THE EVIDENCE. 
Bench trials are reviewed under a different standard than 
are jury trials. When reviewing a bench trial, the Court 
looks to see if the court's judgement was x>against the clear 
weight of the evidence or if the appellate court otherwise 
reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been 
made. State v. Reed, 839 P. 2d. 878, 879 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). 
The conviction entered by the trial court will be 
reversed if the reviewing court finds that "the factual 
findings made by the trial court are not adequately supported 
by the record, resolving all disputes in the evidence in a 
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light most favorable to the trial court's determination/' 
Jouflas v. Fox Television Stations, 927 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah 
1996); State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 935-36 (Utah 1994). 
The Court found that Mr. Peck was vague in his testimony 
about making calls: 
Mr. Peck, with respect to other questions 
during this time, when asked if he'd made 
the calls, his testimony was a combination 
of absolute denial in at least one case, 
but juxtaposed against a statement of "I 
don't recall making such calls" with 
respect to other questions. And that 
struck me as undercutting his credibility. 
If the calls actually had not happened, I 
would expect an absolute denial with 
respect to each question that was asked. 
There was no denial whatsoever with respect 
to delivery of Exhibit 1. I don't believe 
he was ever asked that question. 
Transcript, page 41 line 24 to page 42 line 9. 
The Courts memory of the testimony is not supported by 
the record. The only comments respecting "memory" come in 
connection with Mr. Peck's testimony that on a single occasion 
he punched a button on his speed dial that resulted in a call 
being initiated to the complainants number, but that he 
immediately hung up the phone. 
A. "I remember one call, which was by accident. 
Q. "What happened on that call? 
A. I hung up. 
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Transcript, page 27, lines 23-25. 
Thereafter, Mr. Peck is absolutely adamant in each 
question asked that he never called the complainant. The 
Court's perception that he answered some questions with a lack 
of memory regarding having called is clearly wrong. 
Q. You heard her testify about your 
calling and telling her that you 
wanted to talk to her. 
A. Yes, I did. 
Q. Did that take place? 
A. No, it didn't. 
Q. And you've heard her testify on 
another occasion that - - in March 
that you called her and she hung up 
when she heard your name. Dit that 
happen? 
A. No. 
Q. Now, subsequent to all of this, have 
you had some times when you've talked 
to her, communicated with her with 
respect to the subject of visitation? 
A. I haven't. 
Q. Or any other subject? 
A. No. 
Transcript page 28 lines 7-21. 
Q. Other than this one call that you 
mentioned, where you punched the 
redial by — or the auto dial by 
accident on your phone, did you ever 
call her at 1:00 in the middle of the 
night? 
A. No, I didn't. 
Transcript page 29 lines 5-9. 
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There is no equivocations in the testimony it was 
specific and clear. Mr. Peck absolutely denied making those 
calls. It would appear that the Court misheard, 
misunderstood, or confused Mr. Peck's testimony with some 
other case. What is important is that his finding reveals 
that he was confused by the evidence and that his verdict is 
not properly founded in the evidence of the case. 
Further, it was improper for the Court to infer from the 
lack of testimony regarding Exhibit 1 by Mr. Peck, what his 
answer might have been had he been asked. This is not a 
situation where he was asked the question and stated he had no 
recollection. He was never asked about that document. Both 
sides have the opportunity to present evidence and ask 
questions. It is not the proper role of a witness, not even 
allowed, to volunteer evidence. State v. Lack, 221 P.2D 852 
(1950). There was no evidence that linked Mr. Peck in any 
fashion to the funeral notice, and the Court was improper to 
infer from the lack of testimony that Mr. Peck was the one 
that put it in the complainant's car. The Court mistakes the 
evidence presented, then formulates findings that are not 
supported by the evidence. The findings of the trial court 
are not supported and should be reversed. 
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III. 
THE EVIDENCE PRESENTED DOES NOT PRECLUDE 
REASONABLE HYPOTHESIS OF INNOCENCE AND 
REQUIRED THE TRIAL COURT TO ACQUIT. 
In this case, there is no evidence supporting the element 
of intent, or the purpose component of the element of the call 
being placed. In reaching his verdict, the trial court infers 
from the circumstances surrounding the calls that they were 
for an improper purpose, and with an improper intent. But 
such circumstantial evidence is insufficient to eliminate all 
reasonable hypothesis of innocence. 
The requirement that all reasonable hypothesis of 
innocence must be precluded is clearly embodied in the law of 
this state: 
However, 'where the only evidence presented 
against the defendant circumstantial, the 
evidence supporting a conviction must 
preclude every reasonable hypothesis of 
innocence. This is because the existence 
of a reasonable hypothesis of innocence 
necessarily raises a reasonable doubt as to 
the defendant's guilt.' State v. Hill, 727 
P.2d. 221,222 (Utah 1986) (plurality 
opinion)(citing State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 
216, 219 (Utah 1976). 
State v. Layman, Supra at 786. 
There clearly exists in this case a reasonable hypothesis 
of innocence. That is that these two calls, even if they did 
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take place were not being placed for a purpose prohibited by 
the protective order. So long as this potential exists and 
has not been overcome by a scintilla of evidence to the 
contrary, the trial court was required to acquit. 
In the February 20th call, there is a short exchange 
between the parties, but the defendant only makes two comment, 
both of them the same: "Can we talk?" He does not state what 
he wants to talk about and she never asks. She doesn't 
respond: "Only if its about the children." Or any other 
qualification, she just says "NO" and the call ends. It is 
impossible to infer from this brief exchange what the purpose 
of the call was meant to be. 
In the March call, the complainant testified that as soon 
as she hears the voice of Mr. Peck speak her name she hangs 
up. Again, except for the claim that it happened late at 
night, there is no support for an improper purpose to the 
call. 
CONCLUSION 
There is insufficient evidence to support the conviction 
of the defendant in this case. The only manner in which these 
convictions can be sustained is through the use of conjecture 
and the creation of presumptions that cannot properly rule out 
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innocent motive and intent. The findings of the trial judge 
are against the clear weight of the evidence and should be 
reversed. 
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50 West Broadway, First Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
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Attorneys for Appellant 
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